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I. INTRODUCTION

For over one hundred years, complex litigation has relied upon the
ubiquitous Bates stamp to try and maintain order and clarity in paper
evidence by placing sequential numbers on documents. In today's world
of vast quantities of electronic documents, the days of the Bates stamp are
numbered. Instead, the future belongs to a new technology, a computerbased mathematical process known as "hash." The hash algorithm
analyzes a computer file and calculates a unique identifying number for it,
called a hash value. No two electronic records have the same hash value.
For that reason, it is called the "digital fingerprint" of electronic
documents. Here is an example of a hash value:
162B6274FFEE2E5BD96403E772125A35. Unlike a Bates stamp, the hash
value of a file will automatically and necessarily change if the file is
altered. Thus, hash can both provide objective order and authenticate an
unlimited number of electronic documents. For these and other reasons,
the author proposes a new electronic-evidence naming protocol be adopted
based on algorithmic hash values, instead of sequential numbers. As
explained more fully in the conclusion, the proposal truncates the full
alphanumeric hash value of electronic documents to the first and last three

2007]

HASH. THE NEW BATES STAMP

numbers, and so the above hash value is shortened to the more manageable
sequence: 162.A35.
This Article begins by tracing the history of the Bates stamp, how it
has been used in past litigation, and why it is inadequate to meet the
challenges and unique problems of today's technological world. Next,
hash and hashing will be explained with as little mathematics as possible.
Some of the remarkable qualities of hash will be examined and a few of
the many uses of hash in law and society will be described. As will be
shown, hashing has many advantages over Bates stamping, including
authentication, filtering, and unique search capabilities, and so is ideally
suited to meet the litigation challenges of today and tomorrow. Only hash,
hashing, and hash marking can cope with the incredible volume of data
generated today and protect the integrity of evidence and the judicial
system. As evidence shifts from paper documents to electronically stored
information in ever-increasing quantities, the legal profession must
necessarily adopt hash values over simple Bates stamping.
This Article includes all significant cases to date that mention or relate
to hash. Although the work is, in this sense, intended to be a complete
legal reference, no doubt the comprehensive quality of this Article will
necessarily be short-lived. The number of cases mentioning hash increases
every month. This corresponds with the many new and innovative
applications developed for hash in society at large. Although this Article
will be quickly dated as a complete reference, it should serve as a good
building block for future articles on hash and the law. In the meantime,
this Article may be of some small help to other lawyers and jurists, who
may struggle to understand the many elusive qualities and applications of
this profound mathematical algorithm.
The proposal made at the conclusion to adopt a new hash-based
naming system will, it is hoped, be of more long-lasting value, and will
create a new standard for electronic document identification. I urge the
legal community and electronic discovery industry to begin using this new
naming protocol as soon as possible. The truncated hash value system
proposed here is a timely replacement to the archaic Bates stamp. The
naming protocol is simple, practical, and easy to use. Most importantly, it
can be immediately employed with today's technology to avoid needless
confusion and disputes concerning the identification and authenticity of
electronic documents. In this way, the proposed hash protocol can help
ensure the progress and integrity of our legal system in the dawning new
age of electronic discovery.
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II. BATES STAMPING
A. Origins
Edwin G. Bates invented the Bates numbering machine, and the Bates
Manufacturing Company patented it in 1893. Although the appearance of
the Bates numbering machine has changed over the last hundred years, its
basic function and method of operation remain the same. 2 A Bates
machine uses a self-inking stamp and a mechanically advancing sequence
of numbers. Each time the handle of the machine is pressed, a number is
imprinted on the document below. With every press of the handle, the
number advances sequentially and the next number is inked onto the
document.
Thomas Edison knew a good invention when he saw it, so he bought
the Bates Company.3 Edison's Bates brand so dominated the automatichand-held-numbering-machine market that numbers imprinted on multipage documents were eventually known as Bates numbers.
Incredibly, Bates stamping machines are still used in nearly all law
firms in the United States.4 The only exception may be a few small firms
(the author has encountered them) that never add page numbers to
anything, or if they do, handwrite the numbers on the pages. Even
technologically advanced law offices occasionally use manual Bates
stamping machines to put page numbers on a small set of documents. The
Bates number appearing on the first page of the document identifies a
particular document in a set of documents. This significantly aids in
document identification and organization, especially when there are many
hundreds or thousands of pages involved. Each page in a set of documents
has its own unique number. The number labeling also makes it easier to
prove that documents have been produced to one party from another.

1. U.S. Patent No. 489,449 (filed Oct. 2, 1891); see also Christopher L.T. Brown, Bates
Numbering-What's in a Number Anyway?, Technology Pathways, Technical White Paper (July
17, 2003), availableat http://www.techpathways.com/uploads/BatesNumbering.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2007).
2. See Early Office Museum Web Site, Antique Date, Time, Number, & Name Stamps,
availableat http://www.officemuseum.com/stamps.htm (last visited May 24, 2007) (containing a
drawing of the original Bates Automatic Numbering Machine from an 1897 advertisement); see
also U.S. Patent No. 489,449 fig.1 (filed Oct. 2, 1891).
3. Rutgers University, Edison Papers: Company Records Series-Bates Manufacturing
Company,availableathttp://edison.rutgers.edu/NamesSearch/glocpage.php3?gloc=CK300& (last
visited May 24, 2007).
4. This is based on the author's experience as a practicing attorney for the last twenty-seven
years.
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Absent some unusual circumstances, all American courts accept this
system of identification (coupled with actual custodian testimony where
there is no stipulation) as sufficient identification and authentication to
allow documents to be admitted into evidence. 5 In United States v. Block,
the court references the ubiquitous Bates numbering system and found it
adequate to authenticate the document for admission into evidence as
follows:
She stated that she could identify the location from which the
individual documents were seized by referring to the Bates stamp
and property receipt. Furthermore, Van Etten explained the Bates
stamping procedure used by his company, by which the
documents inside each box received a stamp with a prefix
specifying the box in which they had been placed, and were
numbered consecutively. Because this testimony is sufficient to
support a finding that the documents in question are what the
government claims--documents seized from Block's desk during
execution of the search warrant at NWE-the requirement of
authentication for the admissibility of this evidence is satisfied.6
Of course, a lawyer actually has to put the documents into evidence,
and it is not enough to simply refer to their Bates numbers. This is exactly7
what the plaintiffs did in Andretti v. Borla PerformanceIndustries,Inc.
Plaintiffs referred to documents by their identifying Bates stamp numbers,
but never actually introduced the documents themselves into evidence.
These documents were needed for the plaintiffs to prove their damages.
When plaintiffs learned of this error they argued that since both parties
knew what documents were intended by the Bates stamp number
references, this alone was sufficient to support the inclusion of the
documents into the record.9
The court disagreed, holding that reference to documents merely by
Bates numbering was not sufficient, even if both parties knew what was
intended.'" The court held that the documents themselves had to be placed

5. See, e.g., United States v. Block, 148 F.App'x 904, 911 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
(126 S. Ct. 1175) (Jan. 23, 2006).
6. Id. at911.
7. 426 F.3d 824, 831 (6th Cir. 2005).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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in evidence in order to support the claim for damages." The district court
noted it "could not consider the evidentiary value of documents of which
it was not aware."' 2
As most trial attorneys know from experience, one of the failings of
Bates stamping is that a single document often has several different Bates
stamp numbers. This occurs frequently because, in any fairly large
document production, documents usually appear multiple times.
Consequently, a single document receives several different numbers. Bates
stamps are often confusing for that reason.
However, the alternative of not Bates stamping documents is even
worse. Locating and identifying a particular document in a large document
production can be time-consuming and confusing. Again, this is something
that any practicing attorney knows all too well. This problem is
particularly difficult when there are only subtle differences between
documents, and only close inspection reveals these differences.
Although no one knows when the first lawyer used a Bates machine
to affix numbers to stacks of documents, 3 the author recalls that Bates
stamping was still infrequently used when he started practice in 1979.
Because most cases did not involve more than a few hundred pages of
documents, there was no pressing need to have special numbers applied to
keep track of them. Lawyers would identify documents by their names,
dates, and parties. In multi-page documents, the internal pagination of the
particular document would be used. In cases where there were many
documents, and no Bates stamping, problems quickly developed when
documents had the same name, there was an exceptionally large number
of documents, or reference was made to long documents without page
numbers.
B. Evolution
In the author's experience, a rapid increase in the number of lawsuits
involving thousands of pages of evidence took place in the 1980s. Word
processors were prevalent, and businesses and law firms went from "magcard" electric typewriters to the first personal computers. The number of
documents involved in typical disputes began to multiply, leading to a
greater need to use the Bates stamp machine to help keep track of them all.
11. Id.
12. Andretti, 426 F.3d at 831.
13. It may well have been Frank Lewis Dyer of New York, Thomas Edison's attorney, who
served as the president of the Bates Manufacturing Company after Edison acquired it. See National
Park Service Web Site, availableathttp://www.nps.gov/archive/edis/edifun/edifun-hschool/other_
muckers.htm (last visited May 24, 2007).
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The early promise of a paperless office was never realized. Rather, the
opposite occurred; businesses began churning out ever-increasing amounts
of documents as it became easier to do so.
Eventually, in the 1990s, clever legal secretaries trying to cope with
the tedium of manual Bates stamping of thousands of documents devised
a way to use computers to print Bates numbers onto stick-on labels. The
secretaries could then peel off the labels and stick them onto each page.
Many lawyers and law firms still do this. Although only slightly less
tedious a chore than hand-stamping numbers, this computer enhancement
allowed Bates stamps to easily include letters and words, usually names,
as a prefix before the consecutive numbers. This alphanumeric feature was
much appreciated by beleaguered lawyers trying to keep track of
thousands of pages of documents with merely the numbers as a guide.
With this innovation, documents produced by a witness could be Bates
labeled with his or her name. For instance, a thousand pages of medical
records produced by a Dr. Smith could be Bates labeled "Dr. Smith 0001 Dr. Smith 1000." At a deposition, hearing, or trial, a lawyer could easily
identify a particular document within an entire production. For example,
a lawyer would say "the MRI report of April 7th 1997 Bates stamped 'Dr.
Smith 0075."' Everyone could quickly find that document. Moreover, it
would be clear on the record of the proceedings precisely to what
document and to which version of the MRI report the lawyer was
referring.
C. Modern Use
The next stage in the evolution of Bates stamping came when paper
documents were scanned into Tagged Image File Format (TIFF), or Adobe
Acrobat Portable Document Format (PDF) files. Finally, the computer
alone could directly add Bates numbers. This advance freed secretaries and
paralegals from the tedious task of hand-marking each page.
The latest change in Bates stamping, which may be its dying gasp, has
been adopted by all electronic discovery (e-discovery) vendors. In fact,
most e-discovery software programs currently include a service or feature
where electronic documents are converted into photo image TIFF or PDF
files and a Bates number is electronically added to each page of the file.
Sometimes, the Bates number is simply added to the computer file
names.14 Thus, when a computer file containing 10,000 pages of records

14. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1; Bates Numbering: Black Ice Printer Drivers, Black Ice
Software, at http://www.blackice.com/Printer/ 20Drivers/Bates%20Numbering.htm (last visited
May 24, 2007).
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is viewed or printed, each page will have a number 1 to 10,000 added to
it, or in the alternate file naming protocol, a sequential Bates number will
be added to the original file names. There are obvious advantages to such
a sequential numbering system, including ease of use, at least with small
numbers of documents, and familiarity. But in cases involving voluminous
amounts of electronic documents, these advantages disappear. The
conversion to image files to allow Bates stamping strips an electronic
document of functionality. Moreover, since Bates stamping was designed
for paper, not dynamic computer files, it provides a poor naming and
authentication protocol for electronic documents.
A recent case in district court in Illinois reached the same
conclusions. 5 The defendant converted e-mails into TIFF files, which
eliminated most of their metadata.' 6 One justification for the conversion
was to enable the defendant to "add Bates numbers to every page of every
document, thereby making it possible for... [the plaintiff] to quickly and
efficiently locate and authenticate any documents that Plaintiff refers to or
relies upon as this lawsuit goes forward." 7 The court was not persuaded
by the defendant's argument, holding that the benefits of adding Bates
numbers to the TIFF documents did not justify the failure to produce the

15. Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Electronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04-C-3109, 2006 WL
665005, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006).
16. Id.at *2."Metadata" literally means "data about data" and is one of the key concepts in
electronic discovery today. See, e.g., CATHERINE SANDERS REACH, NEUMILLER & BEARDSLEE,
METADATA (AND OTHER THINGS THAT GO BUMP IN THE NIGHT) (ABA Legal Technology Resource

Center, July 27, 2006), availableat http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/presentations/neumillermeta
data.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007). All computer files have metadata embedded or associated
with them that provide information about the files. For instance, e-mail software embeds in e-mail
files information about its author, creation date, attachments, and identities of all recipients,
including those who received a cc or bcc. The printout of an e-mail, which is essentially a TIFF
version of the e-mail, may not show the blind copies. The metadata will also maintain the history
of an e-mail, its conversation thread, such as who replied, who forwarded, the folder in which it was
filed, and even when or if an e-mail was opened. Also, when e-mail is used to transmit documents
as attachments, which is very common today, the e-mail metadata allows you to know which
documents were attached to which e-mails. The printout of an e-mail, which is essentially a TIFF
version of the e-mail, will not show any of this metadata. SCOTT NAGEL, EMBEDDED INFORMATION
IN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS: WHY METADATA MATTERS (Law Practice Today, ABA Law Practice

Management Section, July 2004). Metadata is currently the topic of ethical debate, especially in
the context of inadvertent disclosures of confidential information. See Formal Opinion 06-442,
Review and Use ofMetadata(ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Aug. 5, 2006), availableat http://www.pdfforlawyers.com/files/06_442.pdf (last visited May 24,
2007); David Hricik & Robert B. Jueneman, The Transmission and Receipt of Invisible
ConfidentialInformation, 15 PROF. LAW. 18 (2004).
17. Hagenbuch, No. 04-C-3109, 2006 WL 665005, at *2-3.
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designated electronic media. 8 The court observed that there were various
ways the parties could identify electronic records without resorting to
Bates numbering, including, "relying on file names and page numbers."' 9
The court also rejected the argument that TIFF documents and Bates
stamping should be used to make evidence tampering more difficult and
easier to detect because "the mere fact that a document is in TIFF format
and Bates stamped does not make it impossible for a party to tamper with
the contents of the document."2 The court was "confident that both parties
will be double checking the authenticity of any documents relied upon by
the other side and, while Bates stamping may provide a simple method for
locating and authenticating documents, it is certainly not the only
method."'"
III. INADEQUACIES OF THE BATES STAMP IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY

Part of the problem facing litigators today is the sheer volume of
"electronically stored information"22 (ESI) now involved in many lawsuits.
18. Id. at *34.
19. Id at *4.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Electronically Stored Information is the terminology utilized in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as revised effective December 1, 2006 to signify electronic records of all types,
including, but not limited to computer files. FED. R. Cw. P. 34(a). Neither the amendments nor the
accompanying Committee Notes define the phrase, but it is commonly "understood to mean
information created, manipulated, communicated, stored, and best utilized in digital form, requiring
the use of computer hardware and software." Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored
Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,4 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 9 (2006), available at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/
njtip/v4/n2/3 (last visited May 29, 2007). ESI is intended to be broadly construed to cover the
known formats of electronic documents, and the as yet unknown forms of data that will certainly
arise in the future. Rule 34(a) specifically states that the scope of the production includes any "other
data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be obtained." Id.
73-76. The Committee Notes accompanying the proposed amendments to Rule 34 explain why the
term is not precisely defined:
The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of
technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of
electronically stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is expansive and includes any type
of information that is stored electronically. A common example often sought in
discovery is electronic communications, such as e-mail. The rule covers--either
as documents or as electronically stored information-information "stored in any
medium," to encompass future developments in computer technology. Rule
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This volume is a direct result of the use of computer technology in
business. The amount of ESI created each year is astounding and almost
defies imagination. A landmark study by the School of Information
Management and Systems of the University of California at Berkeley23
estimated that more than 99% of information created and stored in 2001
was electronic. Moreover, researchers estimate that in 2002 alone, about
five exabytes of new information were created worldwide. That may not
sound like much, until you discover the size of an exabyte. Five exabytes
equals all of the words ever spoken by human beings. 4 The Berkeley study
explains it this way:
How big is five exabytes? If digitized with full formatting, the
seventeen million books in the Library of Congress contain about
136 terabytes of information; five exabytes of information is
equivalent in size to the information contained in 37,000 new
libraries the size of the Library of Congress book collections....
The world population is 6.3 billion, thus almost 800 MB of
recorded information is produced per person each year. It would
take about 30 feet of books to store the equivalent of 800 MB of
information on paper.
The Berkeley study further estimated that in 2003 the world sent 31
billion e-mails and 5 billion instant messages a day. 6 It estimated that the

34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of computerbased information, and flexible enough to encompass future changes and
developments.
2006 Amendments with Committee Notes, Rule 34(a), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/EDiscoverywNotes.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
23. Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information (2003), available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited
May 24, 2007).
24. One exabyte equals 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes OR 1,018 bytes. Two exabytes
equal the total volume of information generated in 1999. Id. See also Whatis.com, How Many
Bytes For?, availableathttp://searchstorage.techtarget.com/sDefinition/l,,sid5_gci944596,0.htm
(last visited May 24, 2007). "Exabyte" is derived from the Greek word for "beyond" or "outside."
DOUGLAS DOWNING ET AL., DIcTIoNARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET TERMS (9th ed. 2006).
25. Lyman & Varian, supranote 23.
26. Id.

20071
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overall e-data was increasing by 30% or more per year.
As of 2007, the
7
world sends an estimated 100 billion e-mails per day.1
A more recent study in 2007 estimates that in 2006 the world created
161 exabytes of data. 28 This is explained to be "about 3 million times the
information in all the books ever written."2 9 The study projects that by
2010 the amount of ESI added annually will increase more than six-fold
from 161 exabytes to 988 exabytes.
While these estimates may be hard to believe, the law is quickly
discovering that the information explosion is no myth; it is a harsh
reality. 3° For example, when Enron collapsed and all of its records became
the subject of government investigation and numerous lawsuits, the parties
discovered that this company alone maintained digital evidence over 200
terabytes3 in size.3 2 Comparing this number to the size of the entire print
collection of the Library of Congress, Enron had twenty times more ESI
than the library. From this, we may reasonably infer that, by the turn of the
century, most major corporations in the United States had already stored
enough ESI to fill twenty Libraries of Congress.
Sequential Bates stamping is inadequate when you start dealing with
these kinds of numbers.33 The information explosion is challenging all

27. George L.Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 18 (2007), at http://law.richmond.edu/joIt/vl3i3/articlel0.pdf (last
visited May 24, 2007).
28. John F. Gantz, The Expanding Digital Universe: A Forecast of Worldwide Information
Growth Through 2010, at 1, IDC White Paper (Mar. 2007), at http://www.emc.com/about/
destination/digital universe/ (last visited May 24, 2007).
29. Id.
30. See GEORGE L. PAUL& BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: E-DISCOVERY
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (ABA Publishing 2006)
("Organizations have thousands if not tens of thousands of times as much information within their
boundaries as they did 20 years ago.").
31. Tera is a metric prefix meaning one trillion (1,000,000,000,000) (10 to the 12th power).
In computer memory, one terabyte equals approximately one trillion (1,000,000,000,000) bytes,
or to be exact, 1,099,511,627,776 bytes. It can also be expressed as 2 to the 40th power, or 1024
to the 4th power, and is equal to 1,000 gigabytes. It is derived from the Greek word for "monster"
or "freak." DOwNING ET AL., supra note 24.
32. This is according to Craig Ball, a lawyer and computer forensics expert retained by the
plaintiffs in the Enron cases. Craig Ball, 5 on EDD: Five Articles on Electronic Data Discovery,
availableat http://www.utahbar.org/cle/fallforum/materials/general2/five-of electronic-discovery.
pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
33. The tobacco litigation cases are a good example of this problem. There were millions of
documents and keeping track of them all was very difficult. To see how lawyers tried to do this and
to get an idea of the complexity of the problem, see Tobacco Institute Index to Documents,
availableat http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com/navindex.asp; Bates Numbers, available at http://
tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/gateway/docs/pdf/Bates.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
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aspects of the legal profession to the core, not just document
identification.34 Indeed, our whole culture seems to be going through
fundamental change driven by advances in technology and writing that
some scholars believe heralds an entirely new phase of civilization.35

IV. THE HASH

ALGORITHM

A. DigitalFingerprintofAll ESI
What is hash? As the term is used today in electronic discovery, it is
neither a food nor an illegal substance; hash is a mathematical process. To
be precise, hash is an encryption algorithm. Hashing generates a unique
alphanumeric value to identify the total combination of bits and bytes that
make up a particular computer file, group of files, or even an entire hard
drive.36 The unique number of a computer file is its hash value, also known
in mathematical parlance as the "condensed representation" or "message
digest" of the original message.37 It is more popularly known today as a
"digital fingerprint."38

34. Paul & Baron, supra note 27, at 1-15.
35. Id. at 1-10.
36. The full hard drive hashing process is explained in Sandersv. State, a child pornography
case:
Lee explained that when he takes a hard drive from a computer, he uses a program
like EnCase to automate the task of searching and finding the files on it. An image
of the drive is taken; the files are copied, and EnCase validates the copy by an
"MD5 hash," a 128-bit algorithm that verifies the image. The MD5 hash is
essentially a "digital fingerprint" of a drive, and if the hash values match, Lee said
that "basically there's no chance" that an error occurred in making an exact
duplicate of the original computer file. Lee used EnCase on computer files taken
from Sanders's computer. EnCase indexed the files, and Sanders was able to
retrieve deleted files containing child pornography from Sanders's computer.
Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Tex. App. 2006).
37. For more technical information on the mathematics of hash, see Ronald Rivest, RFC
1321, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, availableat http://asg.web.cmu.edu/rfc/rfcl32 .html
(last visited May 24, 2007); MD5 Homepage (Unofficial), available at http://userpages.umbc.
edu/-mabzugl/cs/md5/md5.html [hereinafter RFC 1321 ] (last visited May 24, 2007); Tim Boland
& Gary Fisher, Selection of Hashing Algorithms, available at http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/
documents/hash-selection.doc (last visited May 24, 2007).
38. The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery& Digital Information Management, The
Sedona Conference Working Group Series, May 2005, at 21 [hereinafter Sedona Conference
Glossary] (defining "Hash" as "a mathematical algorithm that represents a unique value for a given
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B. Process of Hashing
It is important to understand that the computational process of hashing
is lightning fast in execution. For example, if all of the printed materials
in the Library of Congress, which is estimated to equal 136 terabytes of
data,39 were in electronic format, they could all be hashed in a matter of
hours, if not minutes. 40 Manual Bates stamping of each page would, by
comparison, take several lifetimes of work.
Technically, hashing is based on the substitution and transposition of
data by various mathematical formulas. Thus, the process is called
"hashing," in the linguistic sense of "to chop and mix." Hashing is a
formula, which, so to speak, allows you to boil a file down to an essential
number. The hash value is commonly represented as a short string of
random-looking letters and numbers, which are actually binary data
written in hexadecimal notation. The hash value is commonly called a
file's "fingerprint" because it represents its absolute uniqueness. If two
computer files are identical, they will have the same hash value. Even if
the files have a different name, if their contents are exactly the same, they
will have the same hash value. But if you simply change a single comma
in a thousand page text, that document will have a completely different
hash number than the original. There are no similarities in the hash
numbers based on similarities in the files. Each number is unique.
C. Types of Hash
Many kinds of effective hash formulas have been invented, but two
are widely used today: the SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms. The Secure Hash
set of data, similar to a digital fingerprint." It defines "Hashing" or "Hash Coding" as a method "to
create a digital fingerprint that represents the binary content of a file unique to every electronicallygenerated document; assists in subsequently ensuring that data has not been modified."), available
at http://www.capitallegals.com/Pdf/ Glossary.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
39. Lyman & Varian, supra note 23.
40. Assuming the library books were together in one large file, instead of millions of smaller
files, and assuming a cryptographic algorithmic speed of one hundred megabytes (100,000,000,000)
(109) per second, which seems reasonable on a high speed CPU today based upon crypto
benchmarks. Speed Comparison of Popular Crypto Algorithms, Crypto++ 5.2.1 Benchmarks,
available at http://www.eskimo.com/-weidai/benchmarks.html (last visited May 24, 2007). In
theory, you could hash ten terabytes (10,000,000,000,000) (1012) in only 100 seconds. Theory
confirmed in private correspondence with hash and cryptology expert, Bruce Schneier. See E-mails
to and from Schneier to Losey, Nov. 17, 2006 (on file with author); see also Schneier.com Web
Site, available at http://www.schneier.com/ (last visited May 24, 2007); Schneider on Security:
NIST Hash Workshop Liveblogging, athttp://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/ 1/nisthash
_works_4.html (last visited May 24, 2007).
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Algorithm (SHA) was originally developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) at the U.S. Department of Commerce. 4'
SHA-1 is an improved revision to the original SHA version and was
published in 1994. SHA-1 produces a 160-bit (20 byte) file digest.
Although slower than MD5, this larger digest size makes it even more
reliable, and more effective in a cryptology code-breaking context.42
MD5, or Message Digest 5,was developed and published by Professor
Ronald L. Rivest of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1992. 43
Rivest describes his algorithm as follows:
The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and
produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of
the input. It is conjectured that it is computationally infeasible to
produce two messages having the same message digest, or to
produce any message having a given prespecified target message
digest. The MD5 algorithm is intended for digital signature
applications, where a large file must be "compressed" in a secure
manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under
a public-key cryptosystem such as RSA.'
The 128 bit (16 byte) message digest of MD5, as compared to the 160bit (20 byte) of SHA-1, makes it a faster implementation than SHA-1.
MD5's speed, coupled with its continued reliability,
makes it a commonly
45
used hash algorithm in computer forensics.
Both are very effective because, according to mathematicians, it is
"computationally infeasible," in other words, impossible, for two different
41. NIST, Announcing the Standard for Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Pub. Doc. 180-1 (Apr.
17, 1995), availableat http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip 180-1 .htn (last visited May 24, 2007).
42. Note that the NIST is working on even larger and stronger hash algorithms for national
security cryptology purposes, such as SHA-512, and plan to phase out SHA-1 as the national
standard in 2010. NIST, NIST Brief Comments on Recent Cryptoanalytic Attacks on Secure
Hashing Functions and the Continued Security Provided by SHA-I (Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter
NIST Brief Comments], availableathttp://csrc.nist.gov/hashstandardscomments.pdf(last visited
May 24, 2007).
43. Rivest, supranote 37; see also Web Page on Rivest at the Cryptographers's Lounge Web
Site, at http://www.cryptolounge.org/wiki/MD5; Fast-Sum Software Company's Web Site, at
http://www.fastsum.com/support/md5-checksum-utility-faq/md5-hash.php [hereinafter Fast-Sum
Software] (explaining the basis of its company's product in MD5 hash); Secure Hash Algorithm
Directory, at http://www.secure-hash-algorithm-md5-sha- 1.co.uk/index.htm.
44. Rivest, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 1 n.23.
45. See Shawn McCreight & John Patzakis, Guidance Software, Hash Sets and Their Proper
Construction, athttp://www.guidancesoftware.com/support/downloads/hashsets/hashsets wp.pdf
(last visited May 24, 2007).
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files to produce the same hash value.4 6 An MD-5 hash can generate more
than 340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (that is 340 billion,
billion, billion, billion) possible values. The SHA-1 algorithm generates
a range of values over four billion times larger than MD5. 47 Therefore,
even though there is a finite number of possible hash values, and, in theory
at least, an infinite number of possible data inputs, the odds of two
different files generating the same hash value (called a "collision" in the
language of cryptoanalysts) are "computationally infeasible."'' 8 Reports as
to artificially created collisions are theoretical math exercises performed
on high-speed computers, and at present, collisions do not pose any real
threats to the integrity of hash.49
This means that the hash value of two different e-documents must
always be different. The odds of a coincidental "collision" where different
files have the same hash is "computationally infeasible," on the order of
1 in 100 million, million, million, million, million, million.5" Since such
a large number is hard to comprehend, it is sometimes instead said that the
odds of a collision are "less than one in one billion." 5'

46. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE
CODE IN C 30 (2d ed. 1996).
47. Id.
48. Rivest, supra note 37.
49. See, e.g., NIST Brief Comments, supra note 42; Thomas C. Greene, Crypto Researchers
BreakSHA-1, REGISTER, Feb. 17,2005, availableathttp://www.theregister.com/2005/02/17/shal_
hashingbroken/ (last visited May 24, 2007). But see John Kelsey & Tadayoshi Kohno, Herding
Hash Functions and the Nostradamus Attack-DRAFT, available at http://cyphunk.files.
wordpress.com/2006/02/HerdingHash_paper.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007); Magnsu Daum &
Stefan Lucks, Attacking Hash Functions by Poisoned Messages: The Story of Alice and her Boss,
Institute for Cryptology and IT-Security, Rohr-Universitat Bochum, Germany, at
http://www.cits.rub.de/MD5Collisions/ (last visited May 24, 2007). According to unconfirmed
Chinese press reports, the U.S. government will stop using SHA-1 in four years and adopt a new
more advanced hash algorithm because associate professor Wang Xiaoyun of Beijing's Tsinghua
University and Shandong University of Technology, and her associates, have recently cracked
SHA- 1. Chinese Professor Cracks Fifth Data Security Algorithm, EPOCH TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007,
availableat http://en.epochtimes.com/news/7-1-11/50336.html (last visited May 24, 2007).
50. RONALD A. GOVE ET AL., DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW, Technical Privacy
Measures: Encryption, ch. 4, § 32 (Nat'l Bus. Inst. Mar. 2007).
51. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 24 (2007) [hereinafter POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES]. This Pocket

Guidefor Judges explains a "hash value" as follows:
A unique numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files, or a
portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm applied to the
characteristics of the data set. The most commonly used algorithms, known as
MD5 and SHA, will generate numerical values so distinctive that the chance that
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This mathematical property of hash makes hashing the ideal tool for
authentication of electronic evidence. 2 As will be explained further, this
is one of hashing's key features and the primary reason the legal
profession should abandon Bates for hash. Hash not only provides a
unique identifying name for every computer document or other ESI, it also
evidence has not been altered, either by accident
guarantees that electronic
53
intent.
or malicious
Software to run both the SHA- 1 and MD5 hash analysis of files is
widely available, easy to use, and many are free.54
D. Examples of Hash
The hash value of any file can be quickly calculated, regardless of the
type of electronic file, including graphics. For instance, the hash values of
the instant Word document are:
MD5: 588BCBD1845342C1OD9BBD1C23294459
SHA- 1: C24AE3125BFDBCE01A27FDDA21B3A7E83FAFF69E
If the author changes only the colon at the sentence above to a period, all
else remaining the same, the hash values are now:
MD5: 5F0266C4C326B9A1EF9E39CB78C352DC
SHA-1: 4C37FC6257556E954E90755DEE5DB8CDA8D76710
Although the two files have only this trivial difference, there are no
similarities in these hash values, illustrating that hashing will detect even
the slightest file alteration.

any two data sets will have the same hash value, no matter how similar they
appear, is less than one in one billion.
Id.
52. The Pocket GuideforJudges' explanation of hash supports this proposition: "'Hashing'
is used to guarantee the authenticity of an original data set and can be used as a digital equivalent
of the Bates stamp used in paper document production." Id.
53. Id.
54. A HashTab Shell Extension to Windows is available for free as of May 29, 2007. See
Beeblebrox.org, Hash Tab Shell Extension, availableat http://www.beeblebrox.org/software.php
(last visited May 29, 2007). Another free hash analysis software program intended for forensic
examination is "PinpointHash." Pinpoint Labs, Pinpoint Hash, at http://www.pinpointlabs.com/
freetools/hash/ (last visited May 29, 2007).
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E. The Irreversibilityof Hash
Hash algorithms in cryptography are considered a type of encryption
method; one that creates an irreversible encoding of a file such that the
original message can never be deduced by the encrypted form of the
message, the hash value.55 Normally encryption algorithms are used to
provide confidentiality to a message, and are reversible, in that the original
56
message can be restored by applying the correct, secret decryption key.
In other words, the encryption process is necessarily a two-way, reversible
process because the whole point is to have a secret, encrypted message that
can still be read by the intended recipient." But with hash encryption the
process is irreversible. The encryption is one-way only. The original file
cannot be restored from the hash value; even the basic properties of the
original file remain hidden.58
The irreversibility of hash is its most valuable quality to
cryptographers. It makes it possible to verify the authenticity of a file
while still maintaining the complete secrecy of the actual contents of a file.
Thus, for instance, it can be used to safeguard the secrecy of passwords on
a computer system because only the hash values of users' passwords need
to be stored on the system database.5 9
As will be later explained in more detail, the same irreversible quality
of hash makes it ideal for use in digital signature processes. These hashbased processes guarantee the identity of the creator of a computer file, in
the same way a handwritten signature authenticates the creator of a paper
document. 6' The ability of hash to enable ironclad digital signature

55. FRED PIPER & SEAN MURPHY, CRYPTOGRAPHY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 70-71
(2002); Gregory L. Fordham, E-Discovery: Get Ready to Apply the New FRCP Changes 11, 109
(Course from National Business Institute 2006); GOVE ET AL., supra note 50, ch. 4, § 32.
56. PIPER & MURPHY, supranote 55, at 7-8, 15-17, 71-74. An "encryption key," which may
be either public or private, is applied to an encryption algorithm to create a disguised, encrypted
version of a message. The encrypted message, called a "cryptogram" or "ciphertext," is then
restored to its original intelligible "plaintext" version by applying a secret "decryption key" using
the same encryption algorithm. The original message is thereby restored. The encryption process
is thus reversible, and indeed, that is the whole point so as to facilitate secret communications that
cannot be read by anyone intercepting the message who does not know the encryption algorithm
and decryption key.
57. GOVE ET AL., supra note 50, ch. 4, §§ 1, 2, 32.
58. See, e.g., FastSum Software, supranote 43.
59. PIPER & MURPHY, supra note 55, at 70.
60. Id. at 93-99; see also Biddle, infra note 124 (describing how that works).
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programs is a key application of hash;6 indeed
62 it is the original reason
MIT Professor Rivest invented the MD5 hash.
F. The Value of Irreversibilityin e-Discovery
The irreversibility of hashing makes it possible to perform a hash
search of a computer for specific hash values without revealing the actual
contents of the computer searched. The search can only reveal whether the
Systems,
identical files are present. This is explained in Creative Science
63
case:
theft
secret
trade
a
LLC,
Markets,
Capital
Inc. v. Forex
EvidentData shall limit its inspection of Defendant's computer
network to copying the configuration file of any load balancing
servers and running a utility program that generates a specific
digital signature (a "MD5 hash value") for each file on the
FXCM computer servers to generate a file listing along with each
file's corresponding MD5 hash value. EvidentData will retain
these results in a computer text file. EvidentData shall be
permitted to compare the MD5 hash values for the files on the
FXCM servers with the MD5 hash values for files unique to the
NetZyme software. If EvidentData identifies files unique to the
NetZyme software, EvidentData shall make a forensic image or
logical backup of the file, at the discretion of the EvidentData
computer forensic examiner on site.'
The irreversibility of hash makes it well suited for electronic
discovery in situations involving the search of confidential ESI. This is a
common scenario for intellectual property theft cases such as that in
Creative Science Systems.65 Since a hash analysis cannot reveal the
contents of any previously unknown file, a hash search of another's
computer will not compromise its security. Unless there is a match in hash
values to a known file, the contents are not deducible.66 Conversely, if the
computer searched has stolen data or software, then, as shown in Creative
Science Systems, it can be detected from its known hash values. This kind

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

GOVE ET AL., supra note 50, ch. 4, § 33.
Rivest, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 1 n.23.
2006 WL 870970, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at *4.
Fordham, supranote 55, at 111.
Id. at 109; PIPER & MURPHY, supra note 55.
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of hash comparison will provide conclusive evidence of the existence, or
not, of identical files.67
Hash is an excellent tool to search ESI because it is fast, and it cannot
be easily misled. Hash is hard to fool because hashing only analyzes a
file's contents to derive the unique hash value of the file. It may seem odd,
but the name of a file is not part of the contents of the file.6 8 Instead a file
name is stored outside of the file itself as part of the operating system
filing indexes.69 For that reason the hashing process does not examine or
include a file name.
This means that a computer file cannot be hidden from hash detection
by changing its name and placement, a common practice by "evil doers"
attempting to hide ESI in a computer.7 ° Instead, only a change in file
contents can change the hash value, and thus elude a hash search. For
instance, you can easily hide a stolen file from word searches, and from
human detection, simply by changing its name, extension, and location.
For example, you could change a Word file with a .DOC extension, to an
.EXE extension (change "smoking-gun.doc" to "innocuous.exe") and
move the file to a Windows system directory that normally has many other
executable (.EXE) program files. With this false extension and location the
stolen Word file would be camouflaged and hidden from other inspection.
But since a hash search does not include these parameters, this disguise
will not impact a hash analysis at all.7 The same applies to an attempt to
hide a known virus by name change and innocuous placement.72
An individual can also use this property of hash to search some files
that have been deleted from a computer, since a deleted file still remains
on the hard drive (until it is written over), and only its name and references
have been deleted. UnitedStates v. Eberle73 contains a good description of
a forensic examination of a reformatted "wiped" hard drive, showing how
"deleted files" can still be detected and identified by hash, or the opposite

67. In a recent Wisconsin state court case, the search of a former employee's computer did
not uncover any matching hash value files, and so the court refused to allow further forensic
analysis to determine if the employee had reformatted the computer, characterizing that as a
"fishing expedition." Liturgical Publ'n, Inc. v. Karides, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 313, at 18 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2006). The court also noted that "hash values are defined by the parties as alphanumeric
identifiers of files." Id. n.7.
68. Fordham, supra note 55, at 111-12.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Method and System for Limiting Processor Utilization by a Virus Scanner, U.S. Patent
No. 7,085,934 (filed July 27, 2000) (issued Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Patent No. 7,085,934].
73. No. CRIM 05-26 ERIE, 2006 WL 1705143 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
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can be proven, that those files were not there. In Eberle the hash search
showed the ESI at issue were not on the computer:
Detective Lynn then performed a more targeted search known as
a "hash value check," whereby she searched for a specific
identifier, known as an MD5 hash, that is particular to an internet
image, much like a fingerprint. This hash check similarly failed
to uncover any of the images that had been uploaded onto the
Yahoo! Server in 2001.74
V. THE APPLICATION OF HASH TO AUTHENTICATE ESI
There are many advantages for litigation management to using hash
values instead of Bates stamps. Prime among them is the ability of hashing
to disclose any difference in computer files. As demonstrated previously
by the hash of this Article, the hash values for two files will be completely
different if the file contents are not one hundred percent identical. This is
how using hash confirms with complete certainty whether a file has been
altered. Hash is for this reason an excellent tool to guarantee the
authenticity of ESI, 75 and as we will see, it has been accepted as reliable
for that purpose by courts throughout the country.76

74. Id. at *2.
75. The well-known electronic discovery scholar, Judge Paul Grimm, seems to agree.
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., PWG-06-1893, at25-26 (D. Md. May4, 2007). In this 101 page
decision by Judge Grimm, he sets forth detailed evidentiary guidelines on the admissibility of ESI.
Judge Grimm explains that hash provides a method of authenticating electronic evidence under
Rule 901(b)(4):
Hash values can be inserted into original electronic documents when they are
created to provide them with distinctive characteristics that will permit their
authentication under Rule 901 (b)(4). Also, they can be used during discovery of
electronic records to create a form of electronic "Bates stamp" that will help
establish the document as electronic.
Id.
76. See POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES, supranote 51. No case was uncovered where hash was
rejected as a means of ESI authentication.
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A. The Special Importance of Hash in Native File Productions

Although production of ESI in native format 7 was not typical until
recently, that has begun to change dramatically under the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) which went into effect on December 1,
2006. The new FRCP encourage the production of ESI in native format,
in fact many contend it is now the default mode of production.7 8
The increased use of the native file format makes the authenticity

powers of hash all the more important because ESI in native format is easy
to modify, both intentionally and accidentally. 79 Without hash, many slight

77. Sedona Conference Glossary, supranote 38, at 29. "Native Format" is defined as follows:
Electronic documents have an associated file structure defined by the original
creating application. This file structure is referred to as the "native format" of the
document. Because viewing or searching documents in the native format may
require the original application (for example, viewing a Microsoft Word document
may require the Microsoft Word application), documents are often converted to
a vendor-neutral format as part of the record acquisition or archive process.
"Static" formats (often called "imaged formats"), such as TIFF or PDF, are
designed to retain an image of the document as it would look viewed in the
original creating application but do not allow metadata to be viewed or the
document information to be manipulated.
Id.
78. FED. R. Ctv. P. 34(b). The new rules do not use the term "native format." Instead, the
rules require production of the electronically stored information (ESI) "as they are kept in the usual
course of business or ... in a form or forms ...that are reasonably usable." Id. The usual course
of business is to keep ESI in its native format because that is how it is used. One reason for the
alternative of production in a reasonably usable form is to prevent a party from using native format
as a kind of non-production because the opposing party may not have the ability to read the ESI in
its native format. The opposing party may not have access to the application in which the ESI was
created. The parties can, of course, still request other non-native formats, such as TIFF. They can
also object to a native format production request and argue that another format such as TIFF is
more reasonably usable. Still, native format production now seems to be the default mode under
the new rules, and native file production is likely to become prevalent in the coming years. See,
e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 656 (D. Kan. 2005) (Williams I);
Withers, supranote 22, at 188. At present, however, most e-discovery production is made in either
TIFF or PDF format. Many e-discovery vendors who have invested heavily in software designed
to create and search TIFF oppose the trend towards native format file production and PDF formats.
Some courts also oppose it as an unnecessary expense. Wyeth v. Impax Labs, No. 1:06-cv-222-JJF,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79761, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006); see Kentucky Speedway, LLC v.
NASCAR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006).
79. As an example of an accidental change to a file by inadvertent modification of a file's
internal metadata, if you just open a Word file, and do not do anything other than save it again, with
the same name, and with no changes or other activity whatsoever, you will still be changing the file
and a new hash will result. It has been changed by the mere act of resaving the file because the last
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but possibly significant changes would be hard to detect in large files, and
harder still to prove.
Native files are, in the author's opinion, likely to become the preferred
format for most (but not all) ESI production under the new rules, primarily
because the native format guarantees disclosure of all of the information
in an ESI file, including its internal metadata.8 ° One of the compelling
reasons for the recent changes to the FRCP is to require this full
disclosure.81 The changes discourage the conversion by the producing
party of native files into another format that hides data or degrades
searchability.8 2 This is exactly what happens when, for instance, a party
produces Excel spreadsheets in a TIFF or PDF or a paper format. This
conversion from the native format removes all of the formulas embedded
in the Excel files and thus greatly reduces the usability of the spreadsheets.
The same can be true for the conversion of many other applications, where
metadata and search features are easily lost if particular precautions are not

saved date of a Word file is one of its properties and is maintained as part of the file's own internal
metadata. Conversely, if you open the file, and just close it without saving it, the internal metadata
remains unchanged and so the hash value of the file remains the same. Note that in the second
example the external system metadata on that file will change by just opening and closing it, since
the system monitors "last accessed" date. External metadata does not impact the file hash because
it is not part of the file. The author knows this from experimentation with hash values.
80. See lengthy discussion about metadata production and native files at Ralph C. Losey, eDiscovery Team Blog, available at http://ralphlosey.wordpress.com/meta-prod/ (last visited May
24, 2007).
81. See Withers, supra note 22, at 188. Withers, who is the Director of Judicial Education
and Content for "The Sedona Conference," explains the background:
The files in native formats are dynamic, and behave the way they do in the active
business environment, which may be significant to understanding their function
and content. They also contain non-apparent information, such as metadata
(embedded records of the creation and management of the document), editorial
comments and changes (which may be kept in the native file format for later
revision), and functions (such as the mathematical formulas that determine the
relationship of cells in a spreadsheet or records in a database). The form of
production is more than a question of convenience or cost-it becomes a question
ofrelevance and "best evidence," as it applies to electronically stored information.
Id.
82. Committee Notes to the 2006 Amendments to Rule 34 state: "If the responding party
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by electronic
means, the information should not be produced in a form that removes or significantly degrades this
feature." FED. R. CIv. P. 34, Advisory Committee Notes 2006 Amendment Subdivision (b).

HASH: THE NEWBATES STAMP

taken.83 Of course, it is sometimes necessary for attorneys to intentionally
alter documents and ESI by redacting them to protect the disclosure of
privileged communications, but in those situations the rules require the
creation of a privilege log to disclose and justify the action, and the
maintenance of the original unaltered document or ES1.84
Native files reveal all information, including all of their internal
metadata, and are easy to search, but, as mentioned, they are also easily
altered. For instance, a native Word file can be opened and the date on the
face of the document easily changed.85 Since dates in litigation (who knew
what when) are frequently critical, this one small change to a document
could have a major impact on a case.86 Since the new rules emphasize
native file productions, the authentication properties of hash have become
more important than ever.
B. Hash is Widely Accepted in Civil Cases
Even before the implementation of the new rules, most e-discovery
commentators recommended the adoption of hash for authenticity
purposes. For instance, Michael Arkfeld, in his seminal text on ediscovery, states that "[iln order to prevent any allegation that produced
electronic data has not been altered it is suggested that a hash value be
generated for electronic discovery computer files. ' '88 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland has even included a suggestion that the
parties use hash and hash marks in its local rules.8 9
83. See, e.g., In re Verisign, Inc., No. C 02-02270 JW,2004 WL 2445243 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2004). In this class action securities suit, the defendants were ordered by the magistrate judge
to produce all documents in native electronic form. Id.at *3.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). At the present time it is difficult to redact some types of native
files. For that reason, native files are often converted to TIFF format, and then redacted. Adam I.
Cohen & David J. Lender, Electronic Discovery: Law and Practice §§ 9.05[B], 9.06[A] (Supp.
2007).
85. See Plasse v. Tyco Elec. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Mass. 2006). The plaintiff in
Plassetried to alter the date on his resume, but the defendant's computer forensics expert exposed
his attempts and, as a result, the plaintiff's case was dismissed. Id. at 306, 311.
86. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In this important ediscovery case, determining when Zubulake's supervisor was aware of an EEOC charge was critical
to proving her retaliation claim. Id.at 430. Her supervisor testified at deposition that he did not
know about her charges when he fired her. Id.But an e-mail he thought he had destroyed was later
found, and this proved he did know and had lied. Id.
87. Conversely, metadata and hash are of no importance to paper discovery, where the terms
do not even apply.
88. MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 5.5(G) (2006).
89. U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Suggested Protocol for Discovery of
Electronically Stored Information, at 20, http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf
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The use of hash to authenticate ESI is discussed in detail in a
landmark case in e-discovery, Williams v. Sprint/UnitedManagement C.
(Williams ).90 Williams I is an age discrimination class action lawsuit
where the defendant, Sprint, initially produced Excel spreadsheets in TIFF
format. 91 Plaintiffs complained, stating they needed native files so they
could see the formulas and analyze the files. 92 Sprint delayed, but finally
produced the native Excel files. Plaintiffs then learned that the Excel files
had all been scrubbed of metadata and certain cells were locked so they
could not be accessed. 93
The court had ordered Sprint to produce the Excel records as native
files "in the manner in which they were maintained," in other words,
unaltered. For this reason, upon complaint by plaintiff, the court ordered
Sprint to show cause why sanctions should not be entered for its
unauthorized metadata scrubbing.94 Sprint argued that there was an
emerging standard against the production of metadata relying primarily on
the highly regarded Sedona Principles for Electronic Document
95 especially Principle 12, which states that "[u]nless it is
Production,
material to resolving the dispute, there is no obligation to preserve and
96
produce metadata absent agreement of the parties or order of the court.
Sprint also argued that it had to lock the spreadsheet cells so they could not
be altered, either by accident or intent.97
The court discussed metadata at length, including what it is, why it
can be important, and what the commentaries, primarily Sedona, and case

(last visited May 24, 2007) (encouraging parties to discuss use of hash values or "hash marks"
when producing electronic records in discovery to facilitate their authentication).
90. 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005).
91. Id.at 642.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 645.
94. Id.at 644-45.
95. The Sedona Conference Institute and its publications on electronic discovery are highly
regarded and frequently quoted by courts and commentators. Its key publication, which was
discussed in Williams I, is The Sedona PrinciplesAddressing Electronic Document Production.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT

PRODUCTION (July 2005 version) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.

thesedonaconference.org/publicationshtml?grp--wgs 110 (last visited (May 24, 2007).
96. The commentary to this principle opined that "most of the metadata has no evidentiary
value, and any time (and money) spent reviewing it is a waste of resources." The commentary also
set forth an important exception to its principle 12: "Of course, if the producing party knows or
should reasonably know that particular metadata is relevant to the dispute, it should be produced."

Id.
97. Williams 1, 230 F.R.D. at 655.

HASH: THE NEWBATES STAMP

law suggest is the emerging trend as to metadata scrubbing or production.9"
The court accepted the Sedona Principle 12 as an important part of the
"emerging standard," but rejected Sprint's argument that this meant the
Excel spreadsheets' metadata should not be produced. 99 Instead, the court
found the Excel metadata was material to the dispute, and Sprint should
have known and produced it.'00 The court held that metadata must be
produced absent agreement or court order, and ordered the reproduction
without metadata-scrubbing or cell locking.' °1
The court rejected Sprint's authenticity argument on the basis of hash:
Defendant's concerns regarding maintaining the integrity of the
spreadsheet's values and data could have been addressed by the
less intrusive and more efficient use of "hash marks." For
example, Defendant could have run the data through a
mathematical process to generate a shorter symbolic reference to
the original file, called a "hash mark" or "hash value," that is
unique to that particular file.... This "digital fingerprint" akin to

98. Id. at 646.
99. Id. at 650.
100. Id. at 652-54.
101. The court actually goes well beyond Sedona's Principle 12 and establishes a default
standard for native file production where the producing party must justify production in another
format before it will be permitted:
Based on these emerging standards, the Court holds that when a party is ordered
to produce electronic documents as they are maintained in the ordinary course of
business, the producing party should produce the electronic documents with their
metadata intact, unless that party timely objects to production of metadata, the
parties agree that the metadata should not be produced, or the producing party
requests a protective order. The initial burden with regard to the disclosure of the
metadata would therefore be placed on the party to whom the request or order to
produce is directed. The burden to object to the disclosure of metadata is
appropriately placed on the party ordered to produce its electronic documents as
they are ordinarily maintained because that party already has access to the
metadata and is in the best position to determine whether producing it is
objectionable. Placing the burden on the producing party is further supported by
the fact that metadata is an inherent part of an electronic document, and its
removal ordinarily requires an affirmative act by the producing party that alters
the electronic document.
Williams I, 230 F.R.D. at 652. In a subsequent order, this procedure was applied to plaintiff's
request for the metadata in e-mail and Sprint's objection was this time sustained because it proved
undue burden. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. (Williams I), 2006 WL 3691604 (D. Kan.
Dec. 12, 2006).
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a tamper-evident seal on a software package would have shown
if the electronic spreadsheets were altered. When an electronic
file is sent with a hash mark, others can read it, but the file cannot
be altered without a change also occurring in the hash mark....
The producing party can be certain that the file was not altered by
running the creator's hash mark algorithm to verify that the
original hash mark is generated. This method allows a large
amount of data to be self-authenticating with a rather small hash
assuring that the original image has not been
mark, efficiently
02
manipulated.

In a subsequent order in this case, Williams v. Sprint/UnitedMgmt.
Co. (Williams 11),0 '3 this same analysis was followed to consider a later

request by the plaintiff for the metadata in e-mail. This time Sprint's
objection was sustained because Sprint proved it would be an undue
burden to produce the e-mails in native format. The metadata request was
denied in Williams II in part because the court found that the provision of
hash values for all of the attachments associated with e-mails was adequate
to allow the plaintiff to match up the attachments with the e-mails. For this
reason, a second, expensive reproduction of e-mails in native format with
all metadata was an unnecessary burden." °
Hash not only protects litigants from unscrupulous or negligent
adversaries or experts who might try to alter computer files, it also allows
both producers and recipients of productions to prove the original was not
altered.I15 Judge Grimm makes this point in Lorraine v. Markel American
Insurance Co., 06 an opinion providing a treatise on the admissibility of
electronic evidence, where he notes:
A party that seeks to introduce its own electronic records may
have just as much difficulty authenticating them as one that
attempts to introduce the electronic records of an adversary.
Because it is so common for multiple versions of electronic
documents to exist, it sometimes is difficult to establish that the
version that is offered into evidence is the "final" or legally
operative version. This can plague a party seeking to introduce a
favorable version of its own electronic records, when the adverse

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Williams I, 230 F.R.D. at 655.
Williams I, 2006 WL 3691604.
Id. at *8.
Fordham, supra note 55, at 11.
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., PWG-06-1893, at 26 (D. Md. May 4, 2007).
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party objects that it is not the legally operative version, given the
production in discovery of multiple versions. Use of hash values
when creating the "final" or "legally operative" version of an
electronic record can insert distinctive characteristics
into it that
0 7
allow its authentication under Rule 901 (b)(4).
Since an entire drive can be hashed, not just one file or group of files,
it is possible to conclusively prove that the files or hard drive a lawyer
examines have not been changed." 8 You need only compare the hash
numbers. If the hash of the original and copy are identical, that is
conclusive proof nothing was altered.'0 9 Hashing, unlike Bates numbers,
allows a lawyer to protect an ESI file from alteration and guarantees its
authenticity.
C. Hash is also Widely Used in Criminal Cases
The authenticity guarantees provided by hash have made it an
indispensable tool in criminal investigations involving the misuse of
107. Id.
108. Fordham, supra note 55. Fordham recommends verification that a hard drive has been
correctly copied, also called "imaged," in one of two ways, both of which involve hashing:
Even when tested and reliable imaging tools have been selected for making the
image, current best practices require that the image be verified by at least one of
two options. The first is by re-imaging with different equipment and then
comparing the MD5 hash, or equivalent, of the first image to the MD5 hash of the
second. In the alternative, one could also compare the MD5 hash or equivalent of
the original drive to the MD5 hash of the image. Either method will require at
least two passes over the original drive.
Id.
109. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 141.40 (2d ed.
2007). Norton recommends making multiple forensic images of the debtors' hard drives and then
hashing the original and images to verify authenticity. But see "Bit Flipping," which, among other
things, is slang in computer forensics for a spontaneous switch or "flip" in the value of a bit from
0 to 1, or from 1 to 0. This change in a bit's value is a naturally occurring type of data corruption
that is inherent in today's technology, primarily in hard drives. It can have many causes, including
spontaneous, very slight, variations over time of the magnetic fields that hard drives use to store
bits of information. Due to this decay, a bit value can change from 0 to 1, or 1 to 0. Either way this
minor, usually otherwise undetectable, corruption of data will create a new hash value for the hard
drive (or file). This phenomena can be taken into account and corrected by bit mapping software
that allows you to track and identify any such "bit flips" on the hard drive. You can then restore the
original 0 or I value of the degraded bit on the hard drive and rerun the hash. This information is
based on a conversation with a national forensic expert, Benjamin R. Cotton, Director of Forensics
for Emerging Technologies Group in Herndon, Virginia; and personal experience.
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computers. For instance, most online pornography cases depend upon
hashing to locate and then prove at trial the presence of child pornography
on a defendant's computers." ° In fact, computer forensics experts
employed by law enforcement today spend a large part of their time
searching personal computers and web servers for child pornography."'I
A recent child pornography case, United States v. Cartier,'12 shows
how hash and the latest peer-to-peer (P2P) Internet technology (which will
be explained in the next section) also depends on hash. The ability to
search P2P networks for matching hash files allows police anywhere in the
world to locate and find child pornography on the computers of individuals
who use these networks. Here the Computer Crime Unit of Spain (Spanish
Guardia) advised the FBI that by using a P2P search it had located a man
in North Dakota with substantial amounts of child pornography on his
computer. The P2P search is described in the opinion as follows:
The Spanish Guardia was using a software program it
developed with a private company to search the Edonkey peer-topeer ("P2P") computer network to search for people who
possessed child pornography. The software allowed the Spanish
Guardia to search for child pornography by using hash values. A
hash value is a unique multi-character number that is associated
110. See Richard P. Salgado; Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119
L. REv. F. 38 (2006) (providing a good technical description of hash and its search and
seizure implications). Salgado's article begins with this description of hash:

HARV.

Hashing is a powerful and pervasive technique used in nearly every examination
of seized digital media. The concept behind hashing is quite elegant: take a large
amount of data, such as a file or all the bits on a hard drive, and use a complex
mathematical algorithm to generate a relatively compact numerical identifier (the
hash value) unique to that data. Examiners use hash values throughout the
forensics process, from acquiring the data, through analysis, and even into legal
proceedings. Hash algorithms are used to confirm that when a copy of data is
made, the original is unaltered and the copy is identical, bit-for-bit. That is,
hashing is employed to confirm that data analysis does not alter the evidence
itself. Examiners also use hash values to weed out files that are of no interest in
the investigation, such as operating system files, and to identify files of particular
interest. It is clear that hashing has become an important fixture in forensic
examinations.

Id.

.

111. Douglas Rehman, Electronic Discovery: Everything you Always Wanted to Know Before
It's Too Late, Computer Forensics; Presentation at Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education
Seminar 0286R (Jan. 20, 2006).
112. 2007 WL 319648 (D. N.D. Jan. 2007).
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with a computer file. Some computer scientists compare a hash
value to an electronic fingerprint in that each file has a unique
hash value. The Spanish Guardia was using an investigative
strategy in which it would start with a known image of child
pornography, take the hash value associated with that file, enter
the hash value in its P2P software to search for others possessing
the same image of child pornography, and record the internet
protocol ("IP") address associated with the other person's
computer if that person shared more than five known images of
child pornography. In conducting its search, the Spanish Guardia
did not open the file it located to confirm it was child
pornography." 3
The district court in North Dakota upheld the search warrant
subsequently issued to the FBI, and found probable cause from the P2P
search, even though the contents of the hashed files were never actually
viewed to confirm a match before the search warrant was issued. The court
held that:
While relying on a hash value alone would doubtfully meet a
certainty standard, Judge Senechal only had to find probable
cause. While the use of hash values is not full proof, few things
are. Agent Boeckers possessed information from a reliable lawenforcement agency, the Spanish Guardia. The Spanish Guardia
relied on a trustworthy means of computer forensics. Therefore,
this reliable information established probable cause to issue a
warrant.114
D. Commercial and Governmental Uses of Hash
Many state and local governments are abandoning paper ballots in
favor of computerized voting. Hash is used in computerized voting to
guard against software tampering. The hash values are verified at various
times to guarantee that the voting machine software has not been altered
from its original installation." 5 Hash values have also been used by the
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id. at *3.
115. See, e.g., Celeste Biever, U.S. Boosts e-Voting Software Security, NEWSCIENTIST.COM
NEWS SERV. (Oct. 28, 2004), at http://www.heraldtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20061128/NEWS/61128001/-1/NEWS0521 (last visited May 24,2007); Mares & Company, Data
Integrity: How to Authenticate Your Electronic Records, How to Use Maresware to Validate,
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government to enforce laws prohibiting the sending of sexually explicit
materials to hashed e-mail addresses that have been registered with the
state as belonging to minors."'
There are many commercial applications of hash in a variety of fields.
For example, banks and other institutions routinely use hash to verify that
their software or databases have not been altered, and for other
authentication purposes,' 7 especially involving online banking."8
Hash is also used as a basis for computer virus scanning where the
hashes of known viruses are scanned on potentially infected computers.
This has been the basis of several recent patents." 9 Hash has also been
used in various computer system security devices, where again several
patents have issued for inventions that utilize the authentication properties
of hash. 21 In fact, a Google patent search of "hash values" uncovers 547
patents that mention "hash value" as a part
of the described invention in
2
a wide variety of fields and applications.' '
At least one commercial application of hash designed to prevent the
unauthorized use of certain parts and machinery has led to litigation. 2 2 A
printer manufacturer used the authentication properties of hash to prevent
any off-brand toner cartridges from functioning on its printers.
E. ElectronicData Transfers
Another common use of hash today by individuals, businesses, and
governments is to verify that a data transmission or file download has been
Voting Machine Software, at http ://www.dmares.com/maresware/articles/hash faqs. htm#VOTING
(last visited May 24, 2007).
116. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Shurtleff, 2007 WL 922247, at *2 (D. Utah, Mar. 23,2007)
("The only way that emailers can determine whether or not any particular email address in Utah
has been registered under the CPR is to register to participate in the Registry's so-called 'scrubbing'
services and have Unspam compare hash values to look for matches with any contact point on the
Registry.").
117. GOVE ET AL., supra note 50, ch. 4, §§ 1, 2, 32.
118. See, e.g., Berry Schoenmakers, Basic Security of the ECASH(TM) Payment System,
Technical Univ. of Vienna, Austria, at http://www.econ.tuwien.ac.at/lva/elgeld.ps/literatur/basic
%20security/o20oP20the%20ecash%20payment%20system.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007);
Check Based Online Payment and Verification System and Method, U.S. Patent No. 7,069,250
(filed Oct. 15, 2001) (issued June 27, 2006).
119. See, e.g., Patent No. 7,085,934, supranote 72.
120. See, e.g., Secure Printing Method, U.S. Patent No. 6,711,677 (filed July 12, 1999) (issued
Mar. 23, 2004).
121. Hash Value, Google Search, http://www.google.com/patents?q=%22hash+value%22&
btnG=Search+Patents (including a search of all patents up to the middle of 2006). To search
patents, see http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
122. Lexmark Intern, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).

HASH: THE NEWBATES STAMP

received without corruption or data loss.'23 Hash can also verify a digital
signature of the sender of the transmission, and thus authenticate the
identity of the sender.'24 Digital signatures with hash authentication have
many applications today, including time confirmation for use with patents
and digital art authentication services. 25 One such "digital notary"
company, Surety Technologies, even publishes the hash values of
electronic documents it registers in the New York Times.
This provides
26
authentication.
of
date
and
content
the
of
easy proof

123. See, e.g., LabCompliance.com Information Page, Verification ofFile Integrity with MD5
Hash Calculations, at http://www.labcompliance.com/info/2003/06/030616-md5.htm (last visited
May 24, 2007).
124. See C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and
Liability in a Public Key Infrastructure,33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1143, 1149-50 (1996).
Digital signatures, as contemplated under the Utah Act, involve another step: the
one-way hash function.... If Alice wants to "sign" an electronic document with
a digital signature and send it to Bob, she does not have to encrypt the entire
document with her private key. Instead, she can run the document through a oneway hash function, creating a message digest. She can then encrypt that message
digest using her private key and send it along with the unencrypted document.
Note that every digital signature is unique to the document for which it is created.
So a forger could not take Alice's digital signature from one document, append it
to a fraudulent document, and then successfully claim that Alice had signed the
fraudulent document. When Bob receives the message, he independently runs the
same one-way hash function on the original message to determine what the
message digest should be. He then decrypts (or "verifies") Alice's digital
signature, using Alice's public key. If the message digest in Alice's decrypted
digital signature matches the message digest that Bob calculated from the message
on his own, then Bob knows that the message is indeed from Alice, and that it has
not been altered since she signed it. If the message digests are not identical, then
Bob knows that Alice did not sign the same message that he received-somehow
the message has been altered. If the message digests are identical, Alice cannot
later successfully claim that she did not send the message. No one else could have
created the digital signature attached to the document. Thus Alice and Bob may
have achieved the qualities of data origin authentication, message integrity, and
non-repudiation.
Id.; Dean M. Harts, Reel To Real: Should You Believe What You See?, 66 DEF. COUNs. J. 514, 52223 (1999) (article on the authentication of visual images also provides a good description of the use
of hash in digital signature verification).
125. ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING
AND THE ARTS § 19.2111 (3d ed. 2007); Harts, supra note 124, at 522-23 (providing a good
description of the use of hash in digital signature verification).
126. See supra note 125.
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A recent district court case in Florida considered a patent dispute
' The competing
involving competing digital signature and time stamping. 27
software inventions both use hash to validate when a document is created
and by whom. The opinion describes the hash functioning of the
challenged invention in some detail, showing again how digital signatures
2
and authentication of electronic documents depend on hashing. 1
F. FederalCourt Filings
A similar hash-based authentication system is used by all district
courts in the United States. The federal system's mandatory Electronic
Case Filing (ECF) program uses MD5 hashing to verify the digital
signatures of attorneys who e-file pleadings, and to hash the pleadings and
other documents that are e-filed with the court. Further, although most
attorneys do not realize it, they receive a hash based confirmation every
time there is an e-filing in one of their cases. The district courts use MD5
hashing to create and assign a unique identifying alphanumeric mark to all
e-filings. In a matter of minutes 29 after any e-filing, all attorneys of record
are e-mailed a "Notice of Electronic Filing." That e-mail specifically
identifies the ESI by the name given to it by the filing party and by a very
long computer-generated number called an "Electronic Document Stamp."
The number is actually a 128-place alphanumeric. It includes the 32-place
MD5 hash value of the pleading or other document e-filed, and the hash
value of the filing attorney's digital signature. 3 °
127. Timecertain, LLC v. Authentidate Holding Corp., 2006 WL 3804830, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 22, 2006). The contested patent described hashing and its one-way quality as follows:
"Hashing" subjects a file's digital contents to an algorithm that effectively chops
and mixes (i.e., "hashes") those contents to create a unique string of characters,
which string is called a "digest" and which serves as a sort of digital "fingerprint"
for that file. Hashing the same file with the same hashing algorithm produces the
same digest. Hashing a different file produces a unique and different digest.
Although a digest identifies a specific file, a digest is not the file and cannot be
used to access or retrieve the file.
Id.
128. Id. at *2 (describing how hashing applies to the patented device).
129. Many attorneys with multiple cases in the same district court do not want to be constantly
interrupted throughout the day with these e-mail notices. For that reason ECF allows for an
alternate end-of-the-day notification wherein one e-mail provides notice of all activity in all cases
in a particular district court.
130. Based on conversations with Dick Corelli, Sr., Public Affairs Specialist of the
Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts on Nov. 28, 2006, and with Bruce Walters, a software
engineer and co-founder of Tyberia Development Group, Inc., on Nov. 17, 2006.

HASH: THE NEWBATES STAMP

G. Peer-to-PeerTransfers
Perhaps the most frequent and public use of hash today arises from the
relatively new P2P system of computer file distribution. 13 ' This is a
decentralized system whereby individual users can both upload and
download files to each other on their computers via the Internet. It is most
commonly used for direct "sharing" of media files, such as movies, videos,
and MP3 songs, but is also widely used in online gaming. P2P allows users
to locate and download music, movies, and other files on the computers of
other users. The desired files are located and authenticated by search for
published hash values of the media. 32 Sometimes the web sites promoting
P2P file transfers violate the copyrights of the media owners, and there has
in the highly
been frequent enforcement in this area, most notably
33
1
Inc.
Napster,
v.
Inc.
A&MRecords,
of
case
publicized
A district court in Michigan recently considered a new case of this
type, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fysh.3 4 In Fysh, the court

131. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, What is P2P . . . And What Isn't (Nov. 24, 2000), at
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/11/24/shirkyl-whatisp2p.html (last visited May 24,
2007).
132. The media files are often quite large, and so the files are sent in parts or packets, instead
of one large file. This has led to the hashing of various parts of a media file, and to the creation of
tables of the hash values of media, and sub-parts of the media, known as "hash lists" and "hash
trees." The entries in Wikipedia on these subjects are currently helpful to understand these and
other new hashing applications behind P2P. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Hash Tree, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Hash tree (describing the uses of hash trees) (as of May 24, 2007, 10:00 EST).
133. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The file sharing at Napster.com was held to constitute
illegal copyright infringement, and this led to the closure of one of the most popular sites on the
Internet. The full text of the opinion is available online at http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/
napster/napsterdecision.pdf.
134. 2007 WL 541988 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2007). The copyright infringement suit was
brought by Columbia Pictures, Disney Enterprises, and Warner Bros. Entertainment against Ben
Fysh, a resident of the United Kingdom, who operated www.ed2k-it.com, which was hosted by
Liquid Web, an Internet service provider located in Michigan. Since the web site was operated
anonymously the original complaint was against unknown "John Does." Expedited discovery led
to the disclosure of the operator's identity, Ben Fysh, who never appeared to defend the suit. The
amended complaint alleges that Fysh "operated an eDonkey hash link site." Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Fysh, USDC W.D. Mich., Civil Docket Case No. 5:06-CV-00037-RAE, Doc. #9
(Amended Complaint), 22. The plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment explains that:
An e-Donkey hash link site is a website that contains an index of files available
on the eDonkey network (generally an extensive listing of movies and television
programs, among other copyrighted content). The hash link site hosts and
distributes small files known as "hashes." Hashes do not themselves hold actual
copies of a movie or television program. Rather, hashes are unique identifiers

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

entered a default judgment against a British web site operator who was not
physically present in Michigan. The court found that it had personal
jurisdiction under Michigan's long arm statute because the web site server
computer was physically located in Michigan. A default judgment was
entered for copyright infringement based on vicarious liability because the
web site aided and encouraged others to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted movies and television programs. The web site did not actually
contain the illegal copies, but it contained hash values of the illegal copies
with links to other personal web sites where the materials could be
downloaded in P2P fashion. The hash values allowed the web site users to
find and identify media to upload and download to other users. This
function of the web site was enough to sustain the default judgment and
personal jurisdiction through actions in the forum state, Michigan. Hash
played a key role in this finding as the court explained:
In the present case, Defendant operated and profited from a
website that was "interactive." Defendant's website required
users to download indexed hash files which corresponded to
copyrighted movies or television programs. Defendant's website
also allowed users to acquire login names to accomplish this....
This evidences Defendant's wilful infringement because although

corresponding to particular files available on the eDonkey network-often a file
containing a copyrighted movie or television program. Hashes automatically and
invisibly instruct the eDonkey client program on a user's computer how and where
to get the desired file. An eDonkey server manages the actual distribution of files,
connecting uploaders (those who are distributing a movie) with downloaders
(those who are copying a movie). This server functions in many respects like a
"traffic cop," directing an eDonkey user's computer where to find users ("peers")
who have a particular file, and then providing the user's computer with access to
those other users to facilitate the download process. Hash link sites play an
integral role in the process of using the eDonkey network to download files. Hash
link sites both encourage users to upload hashes that uniquely correspond to
copyrighted content and to index those hashes for easy retrieval by other users.
Further, hash link sites perform a critical "quality control" function that allows
users to efficiently download the best copies of movies and television shows on
the eDonkey network. Hash link sites such as Defendant's are designed in part to
weed out "bad" hashes and index only hashes linking to quality files. In the case
of indexing television and movie hashes, hash link sites are intentionally designed
to enable users to find the best copies of the unauthorized copyrighted works.
Id. Doc. #15, Statement of Facts.
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within his control to delete the hash
links and disable the
135
infringement, he chose not to do so.
Fysh thus appears to be the first case in history where personal
jurisdiction was based on the control and operation of hash. In effect, the
operation of a mathematical algorithm, and posting of its results, was
found to provide sufficient contacts with a state to satisfy the due process
requirements of the Constitution. Both a money judgment in the amount
of $160,000 and a permanent injunction were entered. 136 This remarkable
result shows the importance of hash algorithms to modem culture today,
especially in the area of copyright protection.
VI. THE APPLICATION OF HASH TO FILTER ESI

A. De-Duplication
Filtration is the computerized process of reducing the total universe
of possibly relevant ESI prior to review and production.137 Filtration has
become a standard ESI processing protocol in e-discovery. Filtration uses
computerized processes to eliminate unresponsive files so that less time
will be spent by attorneys to review irrelevant files. This culling process
is, in my opinion, a key step to control e-discovery costs.
There are several automated methods to filter out irrelevant files.
Perhaps the best known is the search method where software is utilized to
search computers for files that contain certain words, word patterns, or
concept patterns and employ boolean logic and even artificial
intelligence.1 38 The ESI containing matching search terms, or hits, are

135. Id. at *2-3.
136. Despite this injunction this web site is still operational at http://www.ed2k-it.com as of
May 16, 2007. It boasts having 60,200 members, with an average of 35 new members every day.
137. The Electronic Discovery Reference Model Project has developed a nine-step model
process for e-discovery projects that is now widely accepted by e-discovery vendors. See Electronic
Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) Project Web Site, http://www.edrm.net (last visited May 24,
2007) [hereinafter EDRM Project Web Site]. The fifth step is "processing" of ESI. It is here that
filtration of duplicate or known irrelevant files is accomplished through hash comparison. EDRM
Processing Stages, Deduplication, at http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Processing_-_
ProcessingStages#Deduplication (last visited May 24, 2007).
138. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, princ. 11, at 44 (stating that the "selective use of key
'concept' or word searches is a reasonable approach when dealing with large amounts of electronic
data."). The Sedona Conference Glossary, supranote 38 (defining "search" and related terms).
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included in a responsive data set, and all other files are filtered out. 3 9
These same search methods are used in computerized legal research such
as Lexis® and Westlaw® and as such are well known to most lawyers.
Similar methods are employed by Internet search engines such as Google®
that are also now commonly used by many lawyers to search for relevant
information. In litigation today, the parties frequently understand and use
search parameters to screen out irrelevant information, such as spam in email and other obviously irrelevant materials.140
De-duplication 4 ' is a lesser-known filtration process, but is very
important and should precede search culling. 42 De-duplication refers to
the process of locating and eliminating duplicate files.'43 It is commonly

139. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate, 300 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2004) ("the glory of
electronic information is not merely that it saves space but that it permits the computer to search
for words or 'strings' of text in seconds.").
140. See Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-BasedDiscovery in FederalCourt Litigation, 2000
FED. CT. L. REV. 2 (suggesting parties adopt collaborative strategies on search protocols); Robert
D. Brownstone, CollaborativeNavigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
53 (2004) (arguing that parties must agree to search terms and other selection criteria to narrow the
scope to manageable data sets); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(showing defendant was justified in using keyword search terms to find responsive documents and
should have proceeded unilaterally to use its proposed terms when the plaintiff would not agree);
Balboa Threadworks v. Stucky, 2006 WL 763668 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (ordering parties to meet
and confer on the use of a search protocol, including key word searching).
141. "De-Duplication ('De-Duping') is the process of comparing electronic records based on
their characteristics and removing or marking duplicate records within the data set. The definition
of 'duplicate records' should be agreed upon, i.e., whether an exact copy from a different location
(such as a different mailbox, server tapes, etc.) is considered to be a duplicate. De-duplication can
be selective, depending on the agreed-upon criteria." Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 38.
142. At least two district courts appear to agree. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,
229 F.R.D. 550, 552 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003).
In the case of a large volume of data on multiple tapes like this case presents, the
restored files from each tape must be compared to the restored files from every
other tape and duplicate files eliminated. The restored files that are not duplicates
must be converted to a common format so that a search program may seek
information within them. The de-duplication and conversion are required so that
large volumes of data in different formats may be searched in a reasonable time.
Id.; In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 2458720 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006)
("Although Defendants complain that the resulting production and need for review of privileged
matters is too burdensome, the permitted employment of de-duplication and search terms strikes
a reasonable balance between Plaintiff's needs and Defendants' burden.").
143. L-3 Commc'ns Westwood Corp. v. Robicharux, 2007 WL 756528, at 2 n.4 (Mar. 8,
2007) (giving a good example of the employment of hash analysis to locate and de-duplicate
relevant files).

HASH. THE NEW BATES STAMP

utilized when reviewing computer files to remove exact duplicates from
the review process. 1 " Effective de-duplication of exact files is only
possible by the use of hash. The process involves comparing the hash
values of different ESI files and eliminating redundant files with identical
hash values. This can drastically reduce the work of reviewers by sparing
them from reading the same records over and over again.'45
Of course, as mentioned, a difference as small as a comma, or a new
saved date, will render a completely different hash value, and so it is
sometimes necessary to do "near de-duplication" analysis to reduce
unproductive review. 46
' Near de-duplication is the location and elimination
of files wherein only segments of the file are identical to other files. It
allows identifying similar but not identical files. This is still a developing
area of technology, but several methods of near de-duplication have
already been developed. For example, you can use a multiple hashing
process to determine if the same content is contained in files with different
fonts, or was saved in different file types, such as in Word, WordPerfect
or Adobe PDF format. Hashing can also be used to determine when fields
or segments within files are identical, even though the entire file might be
quite different. It works by hashing only portions of a file. Thus, for
instance, you can hash only the body of an e-mail to determine whether it
is identical with another e-mail,
even when the "reference" or the "to" and
47
"from" fields are different.
Another variation of de-duplication is called "family hashing" where
larger, logically related groups of files are hashed together. 4 Family
hashing, also known as "family MD5 hash," includes file metadata and
both parent and attached files in the hash group. The hash of the entire
group of related files is called the "family hash" value of the entire group.
Thus, for instance, an e-mail and all of its associated attachments would
be hashed together as one compound file. For two e-mails to be considered

144. Cohen & Lender, supranote 84.
145. Id.; Fordham, supranote 55, §§ 109-110. The chapter in Fordham's book on Producing
Electronically Stored Information, has a good description of MD5 hash and de-duplication,
including valuable practical recommendations on: 1) the "granularity" of de-duplication with
compound documents; and 2) maintaining a list of file hashes that includes the original file location
path. As an example of the first "granularity" recommendation, an e-mail with attachments is
considered a compound document. Fordham recommends that the e-mail itself be subject to one
hash, and the attachments to additional separate hashes. Alternatively, they could all be hashed
together to produce a hash value for the compound file.
146. Id. § 9.03[C].
147. Id.
148. Id. § 9.03[B].
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identical, not only would
the e-mail itself have to be identical, but also all
49
attachments.
its
of
De-duplication is one of the best methods to save time and money in
e-discovery projects. Hashing not only makes de-duplication and partial
de-duplication possible, it makes it fast, cheap, and effective. Since most
computers contain a high percentage of duplicate files, significant time
savings can be realized in data harvesting, analysis, and production. 5 °
When considering millions of pages of data, this is not a luxury, it is a
necessity.
The de-duplication of data restored from back-up tapes is even more
important, especially where e-mails are concerned. On back-up tapes, the
same saved ESI files can be included in every back-up: daily, weekly,
monthly, and yearly. With e-mail, the redundancy is worsened because the
same e-mail could have been sent multiple times to and from multiple
people in the same organization. As a result, an individual can have
hundreds of copies of the same e-mail.
This situation was discussed in an order resolving an e-discovery
dispute in a class-action sexual harassment case.' 5 ' The plaintiff had
complained about the reduction in the number of e-mails to be produced,
from 17,375 to 8,660, because of the de-duplication performed by the
defendant's e-discovery vendor, Kroll Ontrack. The Court upheld the
reduction in production as valid and approved the de-duplication process
with the following observation:
Kroll was also instructed to use the process of de-duplication, the
process whereby documents which appear in a user's mailbox on
multiple days are not counted as multiple hits. For example, if the
same e-mail appeared in an inbox over a period of several
months, only one copy of the document would be produced. After
de-duplication, Kroll found 8,660 documents by searching for the
8 search terms, and by accounting for spam and familycascading.'52

149. Fordharn, supra note 55.
150. Id.; Dan Mares, Using File Hashes to Reduce ForensicAnalysis, SC MAG. (Asia), May
1, 2002, at http://scmagazine.com/asia/news/article/419780/ (last visited May 24, 2007).
151. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570-71, N.D. Ill. (2004).
152. Id.
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Since today most employees routinely save e-mails and other electronic
files, de-duplication, according
to Kroll, can filter out as much as 60-80%
1 53
tapes.
backup
on
files
the
of
B. Known ESI Elimination

Hashing also allows for easy filtration of known files, such as
operating system files and applications.' 54 This is also sometimes referred
to as a type of "data culling."' 55 Many if not most files on office computers
are of this nature, and therefore have no possibility of containing relevant
information.'56 Hashing allows an individual to easily filter out these
standard files.'57 After filtering, an attorney will only have to review files
for possible production that might contain relevant data, and will only have
to look at them once, instead of multiple times.
VIl. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Hashing is fast becoming a standard protocol in e-discovery.5 8 A hash
value is calculated for files at the time they are copied or "harvested" from
a party's computer system. The hash value is then attached to files as a
field of a load file.' 59 This system allows parties to track the hash values
153. Stuart Hanley, E-Discovery "A to Z," Learning Lab; Presentation at West
Legalworks/KrollOnTrack Continuing Legal Education Workshop (Oct. 2006). This estimate may
be very conservative. See, e.g., in re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig, 2006 WL 2458720, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (showing where de-duplication of files restored from back-up tapes
reduced the number of documents from 423,835 to 129,000, of which only 4,000 later proved to
be responsive).
154. The National Software Reference Library (NSRL), operated by the National Institute of
Science and Technology, maintains the hash values of all software commonly found on computers.
In November 2006, the NSRL had hash values for 38,528,599 files. National Software Reference
Library Web Site, available at http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/ (last visited May 24, 2007).Tim Boland
& Gary Fisher, Section of Hashing Algorithms, National Software Reference Library (June 30,
2000), at http:/ www.nsrl.nist.gov/documents/hash-selection.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
155. See EDRM Processing Stages, Data Culling, at http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/
Processing_-Processing_ Stages#DataCulling (last visited May 24, 2007).
156. Fordham, supra note 55, at 112.
157. Hashing will also reveal if viruses or other malicious codes have altered the standard
software files.
158. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 88.
159. The same load file should also contain information as to the location on a party's
computer system from whence the file was harvested. In some instances, it may be necessary to
prove who had what ESI on what computers. The load file could be consulted to trace the original
location of any file, and other key chain of custody facts. See, e.g., ARKFELD, supra note 88, §
5.5(G).
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of unique ESI files or groups of files, and thereby know whether they have
been altered in any way. This procedure is becoming a de facto standard
because it allows parties to verify the authenticity of any ESI at any time
by simply running a hash calculation. 6 °
Since hash values are so important to ESI management, the hash
characters unique to a computer file should be incorporated into a new
naming convention for electronic records. This new naming convention
should be used instead of Bates numbering in final ESI production and for
use at depositions and trial.
First, the hash values should always be calculated and tied to each file
at the time ESI is initially harvested from the party's computers. 16' The
next step in e-discovery is processing, which includes the weeding out of
unresponsive files from the total universe of ESI collected. This filtration
of ESI is accomplished by various methods, including de-duplication to
eliminate matching hash values. Then the next step under the Electronic
Discovery Reference Model standard, is to review these files, both by
computer and manually. 162 In the review process more files are eliminated
as non-responsive or irrelevant. 163 Other documents will be screened at this
review stage as privileged and logged."6 The ESI left are those determined
to fall within the scope of the party's initial production duties, or a later
document request.165 Then, when the ESI files are actually produced,'66 the
production should be accompanied by a hash value log that records all of
the files produced and identifies them by hash value.
At this point in the process, it may be advantageous for the producing
party to further name and identify the ESI files produced. Alternatively,

160. Id. This procedure was, for example, followed in Williams II. The hash values in the email and attachment load files could be used to match attachments to their transmitting e-mails and
verify they had not been altered. For that reason the motion to compel a second production of the
e-mails in native form was denied as unnecessary.
161. Collection is step four of the Electronic Discovery Reference Model Project. EDRM
Project Web Site, supranote 137.
162. Id. step6.
163. Id.; Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 38 (defining "review" as follows: "Review:
The culling process produces a dataset of potentially responsive documents which are then
examined and evaluated for a final selection of relevant or responsive documents and assertion of
privilege exception as appropriate.").
164. Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 38 (defining "Privilege Data Set" as follows:
"The universe of documents identified as responsive and/or relevant, but withheld from production
on the grounds of attorney-client privilege or work product.").
165. This determination is part of step seven, "Analysis," in the Electronic Discovery
Reference Model Project. EDRM Project Web Site, supra note 137.
166. "Production" is step eight in the Electronic Discovery Reference Model Project. Id.
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the parties may wait to name particular ESI files until after they have been
selected for actual use at depositions, hearings, or trial.
Regardless of whether the MD5 hash method is used with 32 digits,
or the SHA- 1 with 40 digits, both are too long for a practical naming
convention. For instance, referring to a file or exhibit as Hash Number
5F0266C4C326B9A1EF9E39CB78C352DC does not work; it is too long
and unwieldy to be practical. It takes too long to read such a number; the
values are easily confused and misread, and it is impossible to memorize.
For this reason, the author suggests the hash be truncated and only the first
and last three
places in the hash value be used, with a dot placed in
67
between. 1
Thus, in the above hash, the characters to use would be 5F0.2DC. The
full 32 characters of the hash fingerprint will still be preserved on the
computer output file for reference purposes, but only the first and last 3
places, 6 out of 32 or 40, need be used in the name. In the rare event (little
over one in a hundred) that the first and last three hash characters coincide
168
between two ESI files, then the full hash values would be consulted.

167. A similar "truncation of hash" method is discussed in the patent case Cable & Wireless
Internet Services, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. where the court describes hashing and
truncation as follows:
The patent describes several ways of determining the new name, including the use
of a family of mathematical functions called message digest ("MD") functions.
One well known algorithm is MD5. The application of the MD5 function
generates a very long unique identifier known as an MD5 hash value, or simply
hash. Plaintiff suggests in its brief in support of the injunction that the number
may be shortened or truncated for convenience by removing nearly half of the
characters. Even as so reduced the number will remain "substantially unique" to
the data so that if the data file is revised, application of the same MD5 function to
the revised data will produce a different number. However, none of the asserted
claims discusses truncating the hash.
Cable & Wireless Internet Serv., Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A.02-11430-RWZ, 2003 WL
1916691, at *1 (D. Mass. 2003). The case continues in this vein discussing an ingenious application
of combined hashing to determine when web pages have been revised. The patent discussed in this
case, and input I have received from patent lawyers, suggests that my model ESI hash naming
proposal could be patented, but I prefer instead that it be freely disseminated as a noncommercial
"open-source" idea. Indeed, I encourage the legal profession and e-discovery vendors to adopt and
freely use this protocol or modify it to fit their purposes. My only claim here is to be the originator,
and occasional mention thereof would be appreciated. As far as I know, I am the first to think of
this truncated hash naming protocol, and know of no other similar proposals.
168. A match is only likely to occur approximately 1.4% of the time. In other words, on
average, only one computer file in a hundred will have the same first and last three hash characters
of a different file. This estimate is based on a study performed by Bill Speros, a computer expert
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I further propose that the number sign (#)169 be affixed in front of the
hash value abbreviation to make clear that a hash value follows. In every
country of the world, except the United States, Great Britain, and other
former British Commonwealth countries, the pound symbol (#) is known
as the hash symbol. 70 So as a small step to positive globalization, I
propose that American lawyers begin using the # to serve as a prefix for
a computer hash number. Thus, the above would be written as #5F0.2DC.
It is important to have a # sign to demarcate where the hash characters
begin, because the last prong of the proposed ESI naming convention is to
put a more human moniker to the left, the way we currently do with
automated Bates stamping. The name could be anything the litigant deems
appropriate, as is the current custom. An individual could use letters,
numbers, or both. As a default, but not necessarily a hard and fast rule, I
propose that ESI be labeled in the left field with the name of the true
author of the file. Thus, if an e-mail was written by Frank Jones, it would
be labeled, "Frank Jones #A73.9B3." In cases where the author is
unknown, the name of the custodian would be used.
Unlike a Bates stamp, a hash mark cannot be added to a native file
directly because this would change the file and create an entirely new hash
mark. However, you can modify the original name of the file to include the
hash mark abbreviation because only the contents of a file are hashed, not
the file name. Thus the original name of the computer file could be
followed with the hash mark abbreviation; "Bil147.doc" would become
"Bil147#A5D.7CI.doc." In addition, or alternatively, an individual could
maintain the full hash value of a file by using a separate but linked load
file. This obviates the need to revise the original name.
As yet another alternative, an individual could convert native files into
TIFF, JPEG, or PDF files to facilitate further review, and eventual printing
of certain records. After this conversion the full hash mark could be added
to the face of each file by the conversion software, along with the author's

and attorney, who evaluated this aspect of the authors' proposal. He compared the MD5 hash codes
of 460,477 files obtained from a typical manufacturing company's servers, plus several dozen of
their networked and stand-alone PCs. Out of the 460,477 files checked, only 6,346 had the same
first and last three characters. If the protocol was changed to the first and last four characters, there
were only 24 matches. Bill Speros, Private Correspondence,E-mail from Bill Speros, an attorney
in Cleveland, Ohio, with 19 years experience consulting in litigation technology and data
management (Dec. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
169. See Wikipedia, Number Sign, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Number-sign (defining the
number sign and giving uses of it) (as of May 24, 2007 09:45 EST); Wikipedia, Hash,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash (showing references to the word hash) (as of May 24,2007 09:45
EST).
170. See supranote 169.

HASH. THE NEW BATES STAMP

proposed shortened first and last three characters version, and, when
desired, the name or number' of the party's choosing. Then when the file
is viewed on screen or in hard copy, the hash marks will appear also.
This conversion and hash marking would necessarily be done prior to
the time of production of ESI, much like the way Bates stamping is
currently done. In any event the hash marking should be completed before
the ESI files are presented' by use at deposition, hearing, or trial.
Regardless of the timing, procedure, or specific methods of
deployment, the key to the successful implementation of a hash naming
protocol is good communication with opposing counsel, and, if possible,
agreements on the procedures to be followed. 7 3 Ideally, such procedures
would be discussed in the initial "meet and greet" session of counsel, as
part of the discussion and agreement on the form of production. " Counsel
should also exchange hash lists and naming protocols before depositions
or hearings, or at least, when the depositions or hearings begin. This would
allow all parties to follow along and verify that the submitted ESI was not
altered. Objections may be made based upon an instant hash of a computer
file that shows it has been altered.
When the files have not been submitted to opposing counsel before
the deposition or hearing, the hashing will have to be made on the fly
during the proceeding. Thus, when an electronic file is shown to a witness
on screen, it may become routine for opposing counsel, or the witness
herself, to make a quick hash check of that file before the witness accepts
it as authentic. If not, objections and voir dire on the issue may be
appropriate. Of course, this would require all counsel to have computers
with them, hash software, and the submission of files via CD or direct
connection. Although to the author's knowledge this has never yet
occurred, it is likely to become commonplace in five to ten years.
At trial, full advance disclosure of all exhibits to be used is generally
required, along with pre-marking of exhibits. The further identification of
trial exhibits should include the hash characters and the naming protocol
recommended here. Since trial exhibits are pre-marked with full
disclosure, the pressure of instant hashing of ESI shown to witnesses at

171. The original sequential Bates number may yet survive for a few years as lawyers and
vendors continue to use them in this modified manner.
172. Presentation is the final ninth step in the Electronic Discovery Reference Model Project.
EDRM Project Web Site, supranote 137.
173. See, e.g., supra notes 89 & 140.
174. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b), 26(f); see also supranote 89; Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232
F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. Md. 2006).
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trial should be lessened. ESI will have all been pre-authenticated, or at
least subject to review and objections, or motions in limine.
In countless courtrooms today, a mantra something like this is heard
often: "I am handing the witness a document pre-marked as 'Trial Exhibit
75' and Bates stamped as 'Dr. Smith 0573."' In the future, the author
expects something like this will be heard instead: "I am putting on screen
for the witness to view an ESI file pre-marked as 'Trial Exhibit 75' and
hash marked as 'Dr.Smith Hash 4F7.C3B (Dr.Smith#4F7.C3B)."' The ESI
file may still sometimes be converted to paper, in which case it could be
handed to a witness, instead of put on a screen, but the same naming
protocol would apply and it would bear a "hash mark" somewhere on the
bottom: "Dr.Smith#4F7.C3B."
Sorry, Mr. Bates, your one hundred-year-plus reign is over.

